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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal taken from an order of the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County over which the
Utah Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3) (j) the

Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of this appeal.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-19(l) the Defendant
Appellant is entitled to bring this appeal as a matter of
right.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether Judge Hanson's factual finding that the
appellees ("Uninsureds") were prejudiced by the active
participation of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah ("BCBSU")
in the Uninsureds litigation to recover health insurance
benefits is clearly against the weight of the evidence?
Whether Judge Hanson applied the correct standard
of law in ruling that the active participation of BCBSU in
litigation constituted a waiver of the right to arbitration
when BCBSU's participation resulted in prejudice to the
Uninsureds?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Section 3 of The Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-31a-3, gave Judge Hanson authority to set aside any
arbitration agreement upon grounds existing at law or equity:
-1-

A written agreement to submit any existing or
future controversy to arbitration is valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon
grounds existing at law or equity to set aside
the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as
provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 4(1) of The Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) authorized Judge Hanson to make
appropriate determinations regarding the existence, validity
and enforceability of BCBSU's alleged arbitration agreement:
(1) The court, upon motion of any party
showing the existence of an arbitration
agreement, shall order the parties to
arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning
the existence of an arbitration agreement or
the scope of the matters covered by the
agreement, the court shall determine those
issues and order or deny arbitration
accordingly.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BCBSU appeals from Judge Hanson's order setting
aside an alleged arbitration agreement between BCBSU and the
Uninsureds on the equitable ground of waiver and following a
factual finding that the active participation of BCBSU in the
Uninsureds litigation to recover health insurance benefits
prejudiced the Uninsureds.

Because the Uninsureds, or

members of their families, are experiencing serious illnesses
for which they have no or wholly inadequate health insurance
coverage, there is great urgency in their quest for relief.
Judge Hanson applied the correct standard of law in ruling
that the confusion, expense and delay caused by the active
-2-

participation of BCBSU in litigation during a seven month
delay in asserting the right to arbitrate resulted in
prejudice to the Uninsureds and a waiver of BCBSU1s alleged
right to arbitrate.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Uninsureds are 11 separately employed dentists

and members of the Utah Dental Association ("UDA") who are
attempting to recover health insurance benefits for serious
illnesses in their families, including but not limited to
paraplegia, leukemia, breast cancer, brain cancer, chronic
liver disease, bipolar depression, heart disease, hip joint
disease, adult respiratory distress syndrome and cerebral
palsy.

(Affidavits of Uninsureds, R. at 521-534 and

608-617).
2.

Prior to July of 1987 Uninsureds and their

families had health insurance benefits for these and other
illnesses under individual contracts with BCBSU, which
guaranteed that such benefits would not be terminated by
reason of their health.
3.

(R. at 521-534, 608-617 and 636).

Prior to July of 1987 the UDA endorsed BCBSU

as the health insurance plan of choice for its members and
encouraged Uninsureds and all other UDA members to obtain
their health insurance benefits through BCBSU.
4.

(R. at 5-7).

In July of 1987 the UDA cancelled its

endorsement of BCBSU and began encouraging the Uninsureds and
-3-

other members of the UDA to obtain health insurance benefits
with the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company.
Uninsureds were told that Massachusetts Mutual would provide
them and other UDA members with health insurance benefits as
good as or better than their BCBSU coverge.
5.

(R. at 5-9).

When BCBSU discovered that the UDA was no

longer endorsing its health insurance plan it immediately
notified Uninsureds and all other UDA participants that
health insurance benefits would terminate, effective November
1, 1987.

Thereafter, Massachusetts Mutual refused to provide

health insurance benefits to Uninsureds and members of their
families who were seriously ill.
6.

(R. at 5-9).

Uninsureds, or members of their families have

serious illnesses or physical impairments that make it
impossible for them to obtain health insurance benefits
comparable to those available under the BCBSU plan.

Because

of these illnesses many of the Uninsureds will never be able
to obtain health insurance coverage for the chronic and
serious illnesses that they experience.

(R. at 5-9, 521-534

and 608-617).
7.

In November of 1987 Uninsureds brought legal

action against Massachusetts Mutual, two Massachusetts Mutual
agents and the UDA.

BCBSU was not originally named as a

defendant because it was felt that there was not a good faith
basis for claiming that BCBSU had terminated the Uninsureds'
-4-

health insurance contracts because of their serious
illnesses.

(R. at 2-10).
8.

As discovery commenced the named defendants

began pointing their fingers at BCBSU.

During August 1988

the deposition of BCBSU plan administrator, Richard West was
taken.

(Stipulation in Appendix).
9.

On September 13, 1988, Uninsureds informed

counsel for BCBSU that because of the information obtained in
Mr. West's deposition they would amend their complaint to
name BCBSU as an additional defendant.

On September 20,

1988, pursuant to request from BCBSU's litigation counsel, an
amended notice of the continuing deposition of Richard West
was sent to litigation counsel for BCBSU.
10.

(R. at 184).

On September 27, 1988, BCBSU requested that

the depositions of Tom Roman, Laura Dieterle and Lynn
Schisser, previously scheduled for October 21, be continued
so that BCBSU's litigation counsel could be present.
depositions were so continued.
11.

These

(R. at 186).

On November 2, 1988 litigation counsel for

BCBSU accepted service of the Uninsureds' Second Amended
Complaint.
12.

(R. at 248).
On November 22, 1988 BCBSU answered the

Uninsureds Second Amended Complaint raising seventeen
defenses but making no mention of the existence of an
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arbitration agreement or of any perceived right to
arbitration.
13.

(R. at 252).
On November 22, 1988 BCBSU filed cross claims

against the UDA, Massachusetts Mutual and agents Henderson
and Sholy, alleging the right to indemnity, proportionment of
liability and attorneys fees.
14.

(R. at 252).

On December 12, 1988 Uninsureds began

preparing their case against BCBSU by serving their First
Request For Production of Documents.
15.

(R. at 312).

On December 12, 1988 UDA answered BCBSU1s

crossclaims. (R. at 298).
16.

On December 21, 1988 BCBSU participated in the

deposition of Lynn Schisser in Springfield, Massachusetts.
(R. at 456).
17.

On December 21, 1988, BCBSU participated in

the deposition of Laura Dieterle in Springfield,
Massachusetts.
18.

(R. at 456 and Stipulation in Appendix).
On December 22, 1988 BCBSU participated in the

deposition of Tom Roman in Springfield, Massachusetts.
(R. at 456 and Stipulation in Appendix).
19.

On December 30, 1988 Uninsureds requested a

Rule 30(b)(6) designation of corporate spokesman from BCBSU
in conjunction with noticing up the deposition of BCBSU Vice
President, Jack Schiess.

(R. at 319).
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20.

On January 18, 1989 Uninsureds noticed up the

deposition of Massachusetts Mutual general agent Larry Hanks
at a time convenient to BCBSU.
21.

(R. at 327).

On January 23, 1989, BCBSU designated Jack

Schiess as its Rule 30(b)(6) corporate spokesman.

(R. at

341).
22.

On January 23, 1989 BCBSU filed notice of its

substitution of David Money for earlier counsel Lee Curtis.
(R. at 332).
23.

On January 23, 1989 BCBSU responded to

Uninsureds First Set Of Interrogatories and First and Second
Requests for Production of Documents.
24.

(R. at 335 & 337).

On February 2, 1989 BCBSU participated in the

deposition of its own Vice President, Jack Schiess.
(Stipulation in Appendix).
25.

On February 2, 1989 BCBSU circulated a

stipulation for a protective order among all parties.

(BCBSU

statement of facts at 15).
26.

On February 6, 1989 Uninsureds requested a

trial setting and management conference.
27.

On February 8, 1989 the UDA submitted its

First Set of Interrogatories to BCBSU.
28.

(R. 344).

(R. at 346).

On February 24, 1989 BCBSU participated in the

deposition of Massachusetts Mutual general agent, Larry
Hanks.

(Stipulation in Appendix).
-7-

29.

On March 9, 1988 Uninsureds finalized document

preparation for their case against BCBSU by serving a Third
Request For Production of Documents upon BCBSU.
30.

(R. at 359).

On March 10, 1989 BCBSU served interrogatories

and a request for production of documents upon the Uninsureds
and Uninsureds began preparing their response.

(R. at 368

and BCBSU Statement of Facts at 14).
31.

On March 21, 1989 Massachusetts Mutual

answered BCBSU crossclaims.
32.

(R. at 371).

On March 30, 1989 BCBSU responded to the UDA's

First Set of Interrogatories raising, for the first time an
alleged right to arbitrate the dispute under § 78-31a-l but
nevertheless, going on to raise objections to specific
questions and to provide answers to interrogatories.

(R. at

381).
33.

On April 6, 1989 Uninsureds filed a request

for ruling on their petition for a management conference and
trial setting.
34.

(R. at 404).
On April 7, 1989 BCBSU filed a Motion To

Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings.

Not until after

this motion was filed did BCBSU inform Uninsureds that they
would not be compelled to fully respond to BCBSU1s discovery
requests which had already been substantially prepared.
at 450) .
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(R.

35.

On August 28, 1989 Judge Timothy R. Hanson

heard oral argument on the BCBSU Motion To Compel
Arbitration.
36.

(R. at 672).
On November 14, 1989 Judge Hanson issued a

Memorandum Decision denying BCBSU's Motion To Compel
Arbitration and finding that BCBSU had "actively participated
in the litigation process" and that such participation had
"been to the extent that arbitration would work a substantial
prejudice on the remaining parties".

(R. at 709).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Judge Hanson's findings of active participation in
the litigation by BCBSU and resulting prejudice to the
Uninsureds are findings of fact made in equity pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3. This Court should not disturb
those findings unless clearly against the weight of the
evidence.
There is abundant evidence in the record to support
the finding that BCBSU actively participated in the
litigation.

In many jurisdictions, testing the judicial

waters to the extent that BCBSU has done constitutes an
automatic waiver of the right to arbitrate with no specific
finding of prejudice.

Because of the serious illnesses

suffered by the families of each of the 11 Uninsureds,, any
delay in obtaining insurance coverage or damages from which
necessary medical care and treatment can be obtained is
-9-

significant.

As a result of BCBSU1s seven month

participation in the litigation valuable time and scarce
resources have been diverted and lost.

Such diversions have

been found prejudicial under circumstances not near so
compelling as in this case.
Judge Hanson applied the correct standard of law in
ruling that BCBSU1s alleged right of arbitration was waived
because Uninsureds were prejudiced by their active
participation in litigation.

Uninsureds agree with the

position taken by BCBSU that the majority of federal and
state courts find waiver of the right to arbitrate if failure
to demand arbitration brings some prejudice.

This rule of

law was appropriately applied by Judge Hanson to the case at
hand.
Because BCBSU is an indispensable party to the
Uninsureds claims against defendants not bound by the alleged
arbitration agreement and because BCBSU has made crossclaims
against these other parties, arbitration will complicate and
delay rather than simplify and expedite the pending
litigation.

Consequently, justice will best be served by

permitting the legal action against BCBSU to go forward.

-10-

ARGUMENT

POINT I
JUDGE HANSON'S EQUITABLE DETERMINATION THAT THE ACTIVE
PARTICIPATION OF BCBSU IN LITIGATION CAUSED PREJUDICE TO THE
UNINSUREDS WAS A FINDING OF FACT AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED
BY THIS COURT UNLESS CLEARLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
Judge Hanson acted in equity when he made factual
findings that BCBSU actively participated in litigation to
the extent that the Uninsureds were prejudiced.

The

Arbitration Act gave Judge Hanson the power to determine
issues surrounding the existence of the alleged right to
arbitration and to set the alleged agreement aside if grounds
existed in law or equity.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3&4(1) .

Judge Hanson's memorandum decision never reached
the question of whether an arbitration agreement even existed
because he found that prejudice caused to the plaintiffs by
the BCBSU delay resulted in a waiver of any agreement which
may have existed.

2/

(R. at 709).—

BCBSU1s motion to compel arbitration conceded that no
arbitration provisions were contained in the parties
original contracts. BCBSU claimed that it had prepared
an addendum requiring arbitration which was believed to
have been sent to a local printer for preparation of
mailers which were believed to have been sent to a
direct mail service which was believed to have mailed
these addendums to all UDA members. Plaintiffs do not
recall ever receiving this alleged mailer. (R. at 444
and 521).
-11-

The brief of the appellant suggests that Judge
Hanson's ruling was made solely upon the pleadings.
not correct.

This is

Judge Hanson's equitable determination was made

after carefully reviewing many sources of information
including the Uninsured1s verified complaint and attached
exhibits, affidavits of each of the eleven Uninsureds and
attached exhibits, the written contract between BCBSU and the
Uninsureds, summaries of the deposition testimony of William
Kidder and Richard West, discovery documents including
notices of deposition and requests for production of
documents and interrogatories between the parties, the
affidavit of BCBSU employee Edwina Howard, and the extensive
oral argument of counsel for each of the parties.

(R. at 409

and 504).
Judge Hanson's memorandum decision, which came
after three months of careful consideration, contains
findings of fact that should not be disturbed unless clearly
opposed to the evidence Thomas v. Thomas 569 P.2d 1119, 1121
(Utah 1977)(memorandum decisions constitute findings of fact
and law); Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 31
Cal. 3d 584, 183 Cal. Rpt. 360, 645 P.2d 1192, 1204 (Cal.
1982)(issue of waiver of the right to arbitrate is one of
fact); and State In The Interest of KKHf 610 P.2d 849, 851
(Utah 1980) .

-12-

This Court has previously declared that it will not
disturb the factual findings of trial courts sitting in
equity unless the appellant establishes manifest error.
In equity proceedings we are charged with the
responsibility of reviewing the evidence, and it is
the established rule that we will not disturb the
findings and determination made unless they are
clearly against the weight of the evidence, or the
court has abused its discretion.
State In The Interest of KKHy 610 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah 1980),
quoting State In The Interest of K

B

y

7 Utah 2d 398, 326

P.2d 395 (1958).
This same standard of review was applied by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in reviewing a trial court's order
regarding a motion to compel arbitration in United Nuclear
Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 290
(1979).

In that case the New Mexico Supreme Court declared

that where the trial court ruling is based upon documentary
evidence or depositions, as in this case, its ruling should
not be disturbed unless "manifestly wrong or clearly opposed
to the evidence" Id. at 305, quoting Valdez v. Salazar, 45
N.M. 107 P.2d 862, 865 (N.M. 1940).

See also Price v. Drexel

Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1159 (5th Cir.
1986)(Ruling that the standard of review in considering
waiver of the right to arbitrate is "plenary" with regard to
legal conclusions and "clearly erroneous" with regard to
factual conclusions.)

-13-

Judge Hanson's findings of active participation in
litigation by BCBSU resulting prejudice to the Uninsureds are
findings of fact made in equity pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-31a-3.

This Court should not disturb those findings

unless clearly against the weight of the evidence.
POINT II
JUDGE HANSON'S FINDING THAT BCBSU'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN
THE LITIGATION PREJUDICED THE UNINSUREDS IS NOT CLEARLY
AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE,
Judge Hanson's memorandum decision contains the
factual finding that BCBSU's active participation in the
litigation process resulted in substantial prejudice to the
Uninsureds and other parties.
This court is satisfied that to allow defendant
Blue Cross and Blue Shield to stay in the
proceedings, either in part or in whole pending
arbitration, would be inappropriate and that the
involvement in litigation by Blue Cross and Blue
Shield has been to the extent that arbitration
would work a substantial prejudice on the remaining
parties. (R. at 709).
There is abundant evidence in the record to support
the finding that BCBSU actively participated in litigation.
Once it was named as a party, BCBSU (a) failed to assert
arbitration as an affirmative defense in its answer; (b)
filed crossclaims against the UDA, Massachusetts Mutual, Gary
D. Henderson and Steven G. Sholy; (c) raised 17 affirmative
defenses; (d) designated a Rule 30(b)(6) corporate spokesman;
(e) responded to and issued interrogatories and requests for
-14-

production of documents; (f) requested and obtained
stipulations from the parties to a protective order; and (g)
participated in five depositions interposing comments, making
objections and conducting cross-examination.
In many jurisdictions, testing the judicial waters
to the extent that Blue Cross has done in this case
constitutes an automatic waiver of any right to arbitrate.
No specific showing of prejudice is required.

Despoil v.

Kohlmeyerf 35 N.Y. 2d 402, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 843, 321 N.E. 2d 770
(1974)(holding that the filing of a crossclaim constitutes
waiver of a parties right to arbitrate); City of Niagara
Falls v. Rudolph, 91 A.D. 2d 817, 458 N.Y.S. 2d 97 (N.Y.
1982)(holding that filing crossclaims and participating in
discovery for 6 months before filing a motion to compel
arbitration constitutes waiver of the right to arbitrate).
Burton-Dixie Corp. v. Timothy McCarthy Const. Co.y 436 F.2d
405, 408 (5th Cir. 1971)(trial court's finding of waiver
upheld even though no specific finding of prejudice since the
sum and substance of the finding was one of prejudice and
detriment to the party claiming waiver).
In the present case, Judge Hanson specifically
found prejudice to the parties resulting from BCBSU's
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participation in the litigation.—

There is ample evidence

in the record to support his finding.

Because of the serious

illnesses suffered in the families of each of the 11
Uninsureds, any delay in obtaining insurance coverage or
damages from which payment for necessary medical care and
treatment can be obtained is significant.

In November of

1987, when the Uninsureds insurance coverage was terminated
by BCBSU, Uninsureds or members of their families suffered
and now suffer from medical conditions requiring expensive
ongoing medical care and treatment.

Because of these

illnesses it is impossible for Uninsureds to obtain insurance
coverage for themselves and members of their families
anywhere comparable to their BCBSU benefits.

As a result,

some Uninsureds face the choice of impoverishment, bankruptcy
or medical neglect.

(R. at 10, 11, 521 & 608).

As of this date, several of the Uninsureds have no
insurance benefits to cover serious illnesses such as Julie
Allen's bipolar depression, Steven Spencer's paraplegia,
David Richard's paraplegia and adult respiratory distress

The argument of BCBSU that Judge Hanson's finding of
prejudice was directed to parties other than the
Uninsureds is ridiculous. Read in context, Judge
Hanson's Memorandum Decision clearly finds that if BCBSU
were permitted to pull out of the litigation after
having participated in key discovery and after the
Uninsureds and other parties had prepared to try their
claims with BCBSU present as a party, the parties
remaining in litigation would be substantially
prejudiced. The remaining parties, of course, would
include everyone but BCBSU.
-16-

syndrome, and Ruth Ann Olsen's chronic liver disease.

Other

uninsureds, who have been able to obtain some coverage,
suffer from inadequate benefits, high premiums and a delay or
outright refusal by their carriers to pay medical bills.
Under these circumstances, a one week delay of Uninsureds1
attempts to obtain a remedy is prejudicial.

BCBSU1s seven

month delay in alleging a right to arbitration has cost the
Uninsureds valuable time, energy and money in pursuing
discovery against BCBSU, in preparing to try their cases
against BCBSU and in accommodating BCBSU to discovery
schedules.
Valuable time and scarce resources have been
diverted and lost.

Such diversions have been found

prejudicial under circumstances not near so compelling as in
this case.

In Reid Burton Const. Co. Inc. v. Carpenters

District Council, 614 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1980) the court
noted that defendant's delay in asserting its right to
arbitration to the point that the plaintiffs had spent time
and money preparing their case caused plaintiffs sufficient
prejudice to constitute a waiver of the defendant's right to
compel arbitration.

The court emphasized that there was no

set rule as to what constitutes a waiver or an abandonment of
the right to arbitrate but that the question depends upon the
facts of each case and usually calls for a finding by the
trier of facts.

Judge Hansonfs finding of prejudice is
-17-

supported by the unique facts of this case.

The New Mexico

Supreme Court has noted in Wood v. Millers National Insurance
Company, 96 N.M. 525, 632 P.2d 1163 (1981), that if the party
moving to compel arbitration causes other parties to believe
that they do not intend to make a demand for arbitration,
prejudice results.

Courts of other jurisdictions have ruled

that the mere expense caused by parties' participation in the
litigation process can constitute prejudice sufficient for
waiver.

Jones Motor Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers

Local Union No. 633, 671 F.2d 38, 44 (5th Cir. 1982) and
National Foundation For Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
BCBSU argues that its substantial involvement in
discovery should not be counted as waiver.

BCBSU argues that

much of this discovery was initiated by Uninsureds.

In Price

v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. 791 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1986)
the court rejected the argument that discovery initiated by
the plaintiff should not be deemed prejudicial.

In the

present case Uninsureds spent a great deal of time, money and
energy pursuing BCBSU with interrogatories and three requests
for production of documents.

The argument that Uninsureds

have benefited from this effort is misdirected.

If

arbitration is compelled, the information discovered in
preparing claims for trial against BCBSU is useless in the
pending litigation.
-18-

Waste of the Uninsureds resources as well as the
benefits which BCBSU has derived from being able to
participate in discovery have caused prejudice.

In Board of

Education Taos Municipal School v. Architects, 10 N.M. 462,
709 P.2d 184 (1985), the New Mexico Supreme Court overturned
a trial court's order compelling arbitration because the
plaintiffs had been prejudiced by the defendants six month
participation in discovery before demanding arbitration, even
though the issue of arbitration had been raised as an
affirmative defense in the original pleadings.

Defendants

argued on appeal that the plaintiffs had not been prejudiced
by the delay because they had merely participated in
discovery, the case was not yet at issue and no hearings had
been held.

Nevertheless, the New Mexico Supreme Court found

clear prejudice resulting in waiver of the right to arbitrate
because (a) the plaintiffs had spent time and money involving
the defendants in the discovery process; (b) the plaintiffs
had begun preparing their case against the defendants,
assuming that it would go to trial rather than to
arbitration; and (c) defendants had benefited from discovery
not available under arbitration.

The court noted that:

By availing themselves of the equitable procedures
of discovery Architects [defendants] realized a
benefit under litigation which would have been lost
under arbitration. Moreover, as the facts of
United Nuclear so vividly illustrate, the discovery
process itself can be a substantial burden, both of
money and time, before the issues are ever joined
at trial. Thus, we find that the conduct of
Architects did induce in Taos [plaintiff] a
-19-

detrimental reliance on Architects1 intent to waive
arbitration.
Id. at 186.

As a result, defendants were found to have

"clearly waived the right to demand arbitration".

Id.

In reliance on the failure of BCBSU to demand
arbitration, Uninsureds spent five months of intense
discovery and preparation to try their case against all
defendants in the same proceeding.

The approach taken by

Uninsureds in conducting this discovery, particularly with
regard to the taking of depositions, would have been
different if they had known that BCBSU would be compelling
arbitration.

If arbitration is now compelled BCBSU will have

the advantage of having participated in the depositions of
four key Massachusetts Mutual witnesses.

BCBSU will be able

to marshal this testimony in their defense at arbitration
without bringing any liability upon Massachusetts Mutual.
Likewise, at trial Massachusetts Mutual will be able to point
to the deposition testimony of Blue Cross witnesses to excuse
its actions without bringing any liability upon Blue Cross.
Had counsel for Uninsureds known that its actions against
these parties would be separated, the Uninsureds approach in
taking these depositions would have been entirely different.
As discovery now stands, both BCBSU and Massachusetts Mutual
will greatly benefit, to the prejudice of the Uninsureds, if
arbitration is compelled.
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In light of the many unique circumstances of this
case, Judge Hanson's equitable finding that the Uninsureds
were prejudiced by BCBSU's active participation in litigation
is not against the clear weight of the evidence.

This

finding should not be disturbed on appeal.
POINT III
JUDGE HANSON'S FINDING THAT THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF BCBSU
CAUSED PREJUDICE TO THE PLAINTIFFS RESULTING IN A WAIVER OF
THE RIGHT TO ARBITRATE WAS AN APPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF THE
PROPER STANDARD OF LAW.
BCBSU urges this Court to adopt the majority
position of courts throughout the country in finding that a
waiver of an otherwise enforceable right to arbitrate a
dispute occurs when a defendant has participated in
litigation to the prejudice of the opposing party before
seeking to compel arbitration.

BCBSU also asserts that Judge

Hanson applied an incorrect standard of law in determining
that BCBSU waived its right to arbitrate its dispute with
Uninsureds in this matter.

Judge Hanson did, however, apply

the very test that BCBSU urges this Court to adopt.

Judge

Hanson specifically found that BCBSU had actively
participated in the litigation to the extent that it would
substantially prejudice the Uninsureds for the court to
compel arbitration.
As BCBSU correctly notes, the majority position of
federal and state courts throughout the country is that
-21-

waiver of the right to arbitrate will be found when the party
seeking arbitration invokes the judicial process to the
detriment or prejudice of the other party.
prejudice is generally tantamount to waiver.

In short,
(Appellant

brief at 18). The relative factors generally considered in
finding prejudice and waiver were reviewed by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Reid Burton Const. Co. Inc. v.
Carpenters District Council, 614 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1980).
The court concluded that arbitration may not be enforced by a
party that has substantially involved itself in the machinery
of litigation before communicating an attempt to arbitrate.
The court defined relative factors in making this
determination as follows a) failure to plead the right to
arbitration; b) filing a counterclaim without asking for a
stay; c) participating in discovery; d) delay in seeking a
stay; e) misleading the opposing party to believe that
arbitration would not be demanded; f) failing to compel
arbitration until trial is at hand; and g) prejudicing the
opposing party by failing to promptly demand arbitration.
In Reid the defendant pled arbitration as a bar to
litigation, but also counterclaimed for damages.

Eight

months later, after participating in discovery, the defendant
filed a "suggestion to dismiss" judicial proceedings because
of the arbitration agreement.

There was further delay in

bringing a motion to compel.

The court found that although
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federal courts typically favor enforcement of arbitration
agreements, waiver may be found where the party asserting
arbitration has "actually participated in the lawsuit or has
taken other action inconsistent with his right."

Id. at 702.

In Reid, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's finding
of waiver.

The present case contains almost all of the

relative factors set forth in Reid with additional factual
exigencies making any delay in obtaining a remedy much more
prejudicial.

While the cases cited in support of the

appellants brief generally set forth the rule of law applied
in Reid and by Judge Hanson, they can be distinguished from
the case at hand in that no prejudice was found.
In Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co.y 779 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.
1985) the court conceded that waiver exists if failure to
timely demand arbitration brings "some resultant prejudice to
a party".

Id. at 887, quoting Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie,

389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968).

In Rush the court found no

prejudice because the delay in demanding arbitration had been
caused in part by the district judge's change of heart on the
issue of punitive damages.

The appellate court also forgave

the defendants participation in discovery because it was
related to claims of the plaintiffs not covered by
arbitration.

Neither of these excusing circumstances exist

in the case at hand.
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In County of Clark v. Blanchard Const, Co., 653
P.2d 1217 (Nev. 1982) the plaintiff claimed that defendants
action in merely answering the complaint was waiver.

The

plaintiffs argument that any participation in litigation,
however slight, was sufficient for waiver was rejected
because no prejudice had resulted.

In the present case

BCBSU's involvement was far more extensive and prejudice did
result.
In Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.
1976) no prejudice was found because the defendants motion to
compel arbitration was filed on the same day that it answered
the plaintiff's complaint.
In Bernalillo City Med. Center Corp. v. Ken
Cancelosi, 92 N.M. 307, 587 P.2d 960, 962 (N.M. 1978) no
waiver of the right to arbitrate was found because "nothing
of consequence occurred to prejudice the plaintiff".
Contrast these cases cited by BCBSU involving mere
delay of "no consequence" with the confusion and seven month
diversion of valuable time and resources involving 11
families anxious to obtain a remedy so that necessary medical
care and treatment can be obtained and paid for.
Under the reasoning of Taos and Reidy supra and the
cases cited by BCBSU, a trial court may find that a party has
waived its right to compel arbitration by participating in
litigation to an extent that causes some prejudice to the
-24-

other party.

Judge Hanson therefore applied the correct test

when he issued his memorandum decision finding that BCBSU had
"actively participated in the litigation process" and that
"involvement in litigation by Blue Cross and Blue Shield has
been to the extent that arbitration would work a substantial
3/
prejudice on the remaining parties".POINT IV
BECAUSE LITIGATION WILL BE COMPLICATED AND DELAYED BY
ARBITRATION, JUSTICE WILL BEST BE SERVED BY PERMITTING THE
LEGAL ACTION AGAINST BLUE CROSS TO GO FORWARD.
BCBSU is an indispensable party in Uninsureds
claims against Massachusetts Mutual, the UDA and Henderson &
Sholy.

(R. at 750-777).

Consequently, arbitration of the

Uninsureds individual contract claims will complicate and
delay rather than simplify and expedite the pending
litigation.

Arbitration will not resolve the Uninsureds1

claims against these other defendants.

Nor, will it resolve

BCBSU's crossclaims against these same defendants.
Regardless of what happens at arbitration, both the
Uninsureds and BCBSU will be back before the trial court to

2/

BCBSU1s assertion that the Federal Arbitration Act
should preempt state law is without merit. The Federal
Arbitration Act applies only to written provisions in
"any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce". There has been no
showing that the insurance contracts between the
plaintiffs and BCBSU fall within the language of the
Federal Arbitration Act.
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continue litigating claims against other defendants.

Judge

Hanson's decision to set aside the alleged arbitration
agreement on equitable grounds will result in the most
practical and inexpensive resolution of this dispute, as
desired by the Legislature in enacting Utah's Arbitration
Act.

Unlike the Federal Arbitration Act, Utah's Arbitration

Act was implemented to provide for the practical and
inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court
congestion.
"The policy of our law favors arbitration as a
speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating
disputes. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah at 449,
15 P.2d at 356. To that end, the Legislature
amended the Arbitration Act to permit valid and
enforceable agreements for arbitration of future as
well as present disputes § 78-31-1. We held that
amendment constitutional in an opinion that
reaffirms the strong public policy in favor of
arbitration as an approved, practical, and
inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing
court congestion.
Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warrenr 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah
1983 K " - 7
Under the circumstances of this case, Judge
Hanson's ruling, requiring that the Uninsureds claims against
all defendants be litigated in the same proceeding will
result in a more speedy practical, inexpensive and just means
of settling the dispute than if arbitration were compelled.

Compare to Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co.y 779 F.2d 885,
891(2d Cir. 1985) declaring that the primary purpose of
the Federal Arbitration Act is the enforcement of
private contracts, not efficiency or judicial economy.
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CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3 granted Judge Hanson the
authority to set aside the alleged BCBSU arbitration
agreement upon grounds existing in equity.

In light of the

unique circumstances of this case and the Uninsureds urgent
need to obtain a remedy to pay for serious uninsured
illnesses, Judge Hanson's finding that BCBSU1s active
participation in the litigation caused prejudice is not
clearly against the weight of the evidence.

His order

finding a waiver of any arbitration agreement which may have
existed is consistent with the standard of law generally
applied in both federal and state courts and should not be
disturbed.
DATED this ]_

day of October, 1990.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DR. THOMAS E. CHANDLER,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

et al.,

CIVIL NO.

C-87-7787

Plaintiffs,
vs.
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Massachusetts corporation;
et al.,
Defendants.

Before

the

Massachusetts

Court

is

Mutual

the

Life

Motion

of

Insurance

the

Company

defendant
for

Judgment, and the Motion of Blue Cross and Blue Shield
seeking

to

compel

arbitration

matters came before the
argument

counsel

had

positions dealing
hearing

with

counsel

Court

and
for

extensively
the

argued

stay

aforementioned

their

respective

Prior
their

authorities

supplementation

of

cited
legal

by

Utah
These

to

oral

respective

Motions.
positions,

Court took the matter under advisement to further
legal

of

proceedings.

argument.
briefed

Summary

At

the

and the

consider

the

the parties, and to allow further

authorities

by

counsel.

Those
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supplementations

have
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occurred,

the

pre-argument Memoranda submitted by
considered

the

argument

of
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Court

counsel

counsel

at

has
for

fully

advised,

enters

the

the

parties,

the hearing, and has

reviewed the materials submitted post-hearing.
otherwise

reviewed the

The Court

following

being

Memorandum

Decision.
Turning

first

to the Motion of the defendant Massachusetts

Mutual Life Insurance Company for Summary Judgment
plaintiffs.

The

against

the

defendant seeks Summary Judgment on the basis

that the Utah Dental Association was a

"employee

organization"

i,

under

the

Employment

Retirement

Income

Security Act of 1974

(ERISA), and that under ERISA, the plaintiffs7 common

law

tort

claims are preempted by the federal statute.
The plaintiffs argue that the

Utah

Association

of ERISA are not applicable to this suit*
that

It

should

be

noted

the plaintiffs are members of the Utah Dental Association,
individually

dental

employed

practitioners.

dental

practitioners

or

retired

The Utah Dental Association, at least on

the face of the pleadings at this point in time, appears
a

is

a "employee organization,,f and accordingly the requirements

not

but

Dental

to

be

professional organization to which the plaintiffs voluntarily

belong.

CHANDLER V. MASS. MUTUAL LIFE

A

review

of

the

PAGE THREE

authorities
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submitted by the parties in

this case lead the Court to the conclusion that the Utah
Association

is

not

an

"employee

circumstances of this case do
statutory

not

Dental

organization," and that the
fall

into

the

appropriate

definitions to bring the plaintiffs' claims under the

federal act.
governed

As the plaintiffs' claims in

by

ERISA,

the

state

this

common

law

case

are

not

claims

are

not

preempted.
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

the

Court determines that the

defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance

Company's

Motion

for Summary Judgment must be denied.
Turning next to the Motion to
Cross

and

Compel

Arbitration

of

time.

A

Blue Shield have
since

being

Blue

Shield

to

is

review of the file shows that Blue Cross and
extensively

joined

as

a

participated

in

party defendant.

the

litigation

This Court adopts

what appears to be the majority position throughout the
with

Blue

Blue Shield of Utah, the Court is satisfied that the

Motion to Compel Arbitration of Blue Cross and
out

of

country

regard to active participation of a defendant vrith a right
arbitrate.

arbitrate
case),

That

(assuming

loses

or

is,
there

otherwise

a

defendant
is

a

waives

who

right
that

to

has

a

right

to

arbitrate in this

right

by

actively
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participating

is

satisfied that to allow defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield

to

the

the

proceedings,

litigation
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Court

stay

in
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either

in

process.

part

or

The

in

whole pending

arbitration, would be inappropriate and that the involvement
litigation

in

by Blue Cross and Blue Shield has been to the extent

that arbitration would

work

a

substantial

prejudice

on

the

Cross

and

remaining parties.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies
Blue

Shield's

Motion to Compel Arbitration.

Blue

Having determined

that the Motion to Compel Arbitration is not well-taken
basis

of

active

raised

the

participation in the litigation by the movant

Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the Court declines
issues

on

to

address

the

by the plaintiff as to whether or not there is a

right to arbitrate on the part of Blue Cross and Blue Shield

in

these proceedings at all.
Counsel for the
Order
the

in
same

plaintiff

accordance
to

the

is

to

prepare

an

appropriate

with this Memorandum Decision, and submit

Court

pursuant

to

the

Code

of

Administration.
Dated this /s

day of November, 1989.

/ #

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Judicial
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foregoing
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/7 day of November, 1989:

Norman J. Younker
Michael L. Chidester
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
215 S. State, 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Phillip S. Ferguson
Attorney for Defendant Mass. Mutual Life
175 S. West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
D. Gary Christian
Attorney for Defendants Henderson and Sholy
175 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David G. Williams
Attorney for Defendant Utah Dental
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David R. Money
Attorney for Defendant Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Utah
170 S. Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

A

correct

copy

the following,

Thirci JudicwS DislricV

DEC 2 1 198.9,
Norman J. Younker, No. A3682
Michael L. Chidester, No. A5263
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 531-8900

By.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DR. THOMAS E. CHANDLER; DR.
MICHAEL E. ALLEN; DR. CLARK
FULLMER; DR. RODNEY W.
LIVINGSTON; DR. GARTH L.
NELSON; DR. GENE M. RICHARDS;
DR. PHILLIP H. SPENCER;
DR. CLIVE C. INGRAM;
DR. DAVID B. HINCKS;
DR. ALDEAN WASHBURN; and DR. PAUL
R. OLSEN; individually and on
behalf Of MEMBERS OF THE UTAH
DENTAL ASSOCIATION,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
BLUE CROSS £. BLUE SHIELD
OF UTAH'S MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION AND
TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
Civil No. 87-07787

Plaintiffs,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts
corporation; GARY D.
HENDERSON; STEVEN G. SHOLY; the
UTAH DENTAL ASSOCIATION, a Utah
incorporated association; and
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF
UTAH, a Utah corporation.
Defendants.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant Blue Cross & Blue Shield's Motion to Compel
Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings came on for hearing on August
28, 1989, at 2:00 P.M.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah was rep-

resented by David R. Money and Timothy C. Houpt.

Norman J.

Younker and Michael L. Chidester appeared on behalf of plaintiffs.

Also present were Heinz Mahler on behalf of defendants

Gary D. Henderson and Steven G. Sholy and Karra Porter on behalf
of defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company.

Upon

consideration of the moving papers, the written memoranda, exhib
its and oral arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings
is denied.

The Court finds that Blue Cross & Blue Shield has

participated in the litigation since being joined as a party
defendant to such an extent that any right to arbitration has
been waived and that arbitration would work a substantial prejudice on the remaining parties.
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DATED t h i s , y /

day of Novemb«S 1989

'imothy R. Hanson
'District Court Judge
APPR

ATTEST
D a v i d R. fcon^y / v / ^ /
JONES, WALDO, HOLBRcSoK £. MCDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah

MLC:112189C
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

DR. THOMAS E. CHANDLER; DR. MICHAEL E.
ALLEN; DR. CLARK FULLMER;
DR. RODNEY W. LIVINGSTON; DR. GARTH L.
NELSON; DR. GENE M. RICHARDS;
DR. PHILLIP H. SPENCER; DR. CLIVE C.
INGRAM; DR. DAVID B. HINCKS;
DR. ALDEAN WASHBURN; and DR. PAUL R.
OLSEN; individually and on behalf of
MEMBERS OF THE UTAH DENTAL
ASSOCIATION,

STIPULATION TO
SUPPLEMENT RECORD
ON APPEAL
Case No. 890540
Priority No. 16

Plaintiffs/Appellees,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Massachusetts corporation;
GARY D. HENDERSON; STEVEN G. SHOLY;
the UTAH DENTAL ASSOCIATION, a Utah
incorporated association,
Defendants,
and
BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD OF UTAH,
Defendant/Appellant.
The Appellant and Appellees, by and through their counsel
of record, hereby stipulate that the following facts be made a part
of the record on appeal.
1.

During August of 1988 the deposition of Blue Cross

and Blue Shield of Utah ("BCBSU") plan administrator, Richard West,
was taken.
2.

On December 21, 1988, BCBSU participated in the depo-

sition of Lynn Schisser in Springfield, Massachusetts.
3.

On December 21, 1988, BCBSU participated in the depo-

sition of Laura Dieterle in Springfield, Massachusetts.
4.

On December 22, 1988, BCBSU participated in the depo-

sition of Tom Roman in Springfield, Massachusetts.

5.

On February 2, 1989, BCBSU participated in the

deposition of its own Vice President, Jack Schiess.
6.

On February 24, 1989, BCBSU participated in the

deposition of Massachusetts Mutual general agent, Larry Hanks.
DATED this

day of October, 1990.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

Ibrman J.
Attorneys
Appe11

er
laintiffs/

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

By:
Timothy Houpt
'
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant

NJY:100190A
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this /

/
day of October,

1990, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, first-class,
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellees to the following:
David Money
Timothy Houpt
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Ray R. Christensen
Phillip S. Ferguson
Christensen, Jensen & Powell
175 South West Temple
510 Clark Learning Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David G. Williams
Larry R. Laycock
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Eleventh Floor
10 Exchange Place
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Gary Christian
Kipp & Christian
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

MLC:092490A

84145

